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Abstract 
Person-to-person lending (P2PL) on the Internet is a relatively new credit market. The success of 
these markets hinges on their ability to provide both borrowers and lenders the chance to improve 
on the opportunities available in traditional intermediated credit markets. In essence, P2PL must 
create a more competitive market. Empirical observations provide evidence that frictions exist in 
these markets, which generally move markets away from competitive outcomes. Currently, 
auctions are the most popular mechanism for P2PL. This paper develops and analyzes an 
equilibrium competing auction model of P2PL. Coordination frictions and the presence of non-
creditworthy borrowers create an environment where many potentially productive transactions 
are not made and interest rate dispersion is observed. Additionally, if the market naturally 
segments into groups of similar borrowers then increased frictions in a segment may lead some 
portion of lenders to migrate to a different segment.         
Keywords:  Person-to-Person Lending, Price Dispersion, Competing Auction  
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Résumé 
Le prêt de particulier à particulier sur internet est relativement nouveau sur le marché de crédit. Le succès de ces 
marchés dépend de leur capacité à créer un environnement plus concurrentiel. Nous présentons des preuves 
empiriques de frictions sur ces marchés. Ces frictions empêchent les marchés d'obtenir des résultats compétitifs. 
Nous développons et analysons un modèle d'enchères compétitives de prêt de particulier à particulier. 
 
Introduction 
Person-to-person lending (P2PL) on the Internet is a relatively new innovation. In these markets, prospective 
borrowers seeking unsecured personal loans create a loan request, a listing, and lenders offer to fund small portions 
of any particular loan. New websites facilitating P2PL continue to emerge with some focusing on formally 
structuring lending arrangements between family and friends, some facilitate P2P loans to borrowers in developing 
nations, and others deal in consumer loans between people who do not necessarily have a prior personal relationship. 
This paper investigates the last of these P2PL markets. 
There are at least two motivating concepts behind P2PL. One is that individuals participating in these markets derive 
some social utility from borrowing directly from and lending directly to individuals. Another is that there are 
financial incentives for operating in such a market. Assuming financial intermediaries earn positive economic 
profits, P2PL offers borrowers and lenders the opportunity to cut out the intermediaries' role and enhance the surplus 
in credit markets. 
There is burgeoning academic interest in P2PL on such topics as the value added services in P2PL markets (Berger 
and Gleisner 2008), and racial discrimination (Pope and Sydnor 2008), but there has not been much discussion on 
the fundamental promise of Person-to-Person lending to enhance welfare in credit markets and its ability to deliver 
on that promise. The purpose of this paper is to begin such a discussion. 
Traditionally, intermediaries such as banks have played the central role in the transfer of funds between borrowers 
and lenders. In this paper we will use the term lender to mean individuals who supply funds to a credit market, be 
they P2P lenders or bank depositors. The market for consumer loans in the US is large – thousands of 
intermediaries, and millions of borrowers and lenders. One might expect this market to be well approximated by a 
model of perfect competition. In which case, similar borrowers would obtain identical interest rates on comparable 
loans. The reality is that traditional consumer credit markets do not behave in a perfectly competitive fashion. This 
is evident when one considers the presence of two similarly featured credit cards that carry different interest rates in 
a person’s wallet or purse.  
This is good news for P2PL proponents, but also an important reminder of the value proposition that P2PL must 
offer to be successful in the long run. Namely, P2PL must enhance credit market competitiveness.  
There is evidence that the Internet can drive markets to a more competitive position (Brown and Goolsbee 2002). 
Yet, price dispersion on the Internet is still the rule rather than the exception even for homogeneous goods (Baye et. 
al. 2004; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Clay et. al. 2001). With respect to P2PL the question remains, can direct 
lending through the Internet create a more competitive credit market? 
This paper does not go so far as to provide a direct empirical or theoretical comparison of the competitive 
environment in traditional and P2P credit markets. We do provide some key empirical observations that P2PL 
markets cannot currently be described as competitive as well as a highly stylized competing auction model of P2PL 
which results in market imperfection. 
The competing auction framework specifically considers the coordination frictions and need for search that dampen 
the efficiency of P2PL markets. Moreover, the models allow us to consider market equilibrium when there are 
distinct market segments, i.e. credit grade. We assume a market segment can be characterized by a ratio of 
creditworthy and non-creditworthy borrowers and some ability of lenders to distinguish between the two. Increasing 
the entrance of non-creditworthy borrowers to a market segment can cause lenders to migrate from the segment. 
This alters outcomes – interest rates and loan quantity – not just for members of the segment with the increased 
number of non-creditworthy borrowers, but market-wide. The model produces interest rate dispersion as a 
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consequence of stochastic levels of competition for individual loans and the posterior belief that a borrower is 
creditworthy conditional on the level of competition. 
Next we provide a brief introduction to P2PL. The following section outlines the key empirical observations that 
being a P2P lender is not a frictionless proposition, antithetic to the notion of perfect competition, and that these 
frictions manifest themselves in substantial interest rate dispersion for similar borrowers. We proceed with a 
discussion of the price dispersion and competing auction literature before presenting and analyzing our competing 
auction models of P2PL. 
P2PL Described 
The following description of P2PL draws on the largest American P2P website Prosper.com as an example. The data 
analyzed in the next section are also from Prosper. Other P2PL markets are similar. 
P2PL borrowers create loan requests, or listings, for three-year, unsecured loans in an amount ranging from $1,000 
to $25,000 dollars. Posting a listing means consenting to the disclosure of credit information to certified lenders (see 
Table 1 for the credit and other information in a listing). In addition to credit information, prospective borrowers are 
allowed to describe the purpose of the loan, their financial situation, post photos, and publicly and/or privately 
answer questions submitted to them by lenders. 
Table 1. Listing Information 
Credit Related: Other: 
       Credit Grade (AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR)        Descriptive Listing Title 
       Current Delinquencies        Description (free form text) 
       Bankcard Utilization        Images (picture of borrower, car to be purchased, etc.) 
       Occupation        Publicly Answered Lender Queries 
       Current Credit Lines        Amount Requested 
       Delinquencies Last 7 Years        Funding Option (Autofund or Auction style) 
       Employment Status        Maximum Allowable Interest Rate 
       First Recorded Line Of Credit        Borrower City 
       Income Range (top coded at 100K)        Borrower State 
       Credit Inquires in the Last 6 Months  
       Time with Current Employer  
       Number of Open Credit Lines  
       Number of Public Records in the Last 10 Years  
       Number of Public Records in the Last 12 Months  
       Revolving Credit Balance  
       Total Credit Lines  
       Homeowner Status  
       Debt-to-Income Ratio  
 
A listing only becomes a loan if lenders bid enough funds to cover the entire amount requested. This feature of the 
market requires some consensus on the part of a number of lenders that the listing should become a loan. Lenders 
choose how much they are willing to invest in the loan from a current minimum of $50 to the full amount requested. 
Many lenders choose to bid the minimum amount on each loan thus diversifying across a large number of loans. 
Until recently, listings could run anywhere from three to ten days as chosen by the prospective borrower, but this 
was standardized to seven days for all listings. If a listing does not fully fund during the run-time then it expires. 
Borrowers may also withdraw a listing at any point before a loan is originated. 
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Prosper has two mechanisms for determining the interest rate on loans. First, a borrower can specify the interest rate 
they are willing to pay. This type of listing is called an autofund listing, and a listing closes at this borrower 
specified interest rate immediately upon receiving sufficient funding within the listing run-time. Second, the interest 
rate is set through a reverse auction mechanism. In auction style listings lenders bid what portion of the loan they 
want to fund as well as what interest rate they are willing to accept. Borrowers set the starting interest rate, or 
reservation price, which represents the maximum interest rate a lender can bid. At the end of the auction the interest 
rate on the loan is set to the minimum required to obtain a fully funded loan (a K + 1st price auction). So, those 
lenders that bid the lowest interest rates become the participating lenders on the loan, but the final interest rate is 
determined by the lowest outbid lender. The current paper will focus solely on the auction style P2P markets. 
Prosper manages all payments on loans and the disbursement of payments to the individual lenders. Servicing the 
loan also includes reporting to the credit bureaus and initiating collections procedures and selling delinquent loans. 
Prosper's revenues come from two sources: 1) Prosper charges the borrower an origination fee when a listing 
becomes a loan, 2) Prosper assesses a service fee to lenders on each incoming payment. 
Key Empirical Observations on P2PL 
This section outlines some evidence of market frictions on Prosper.com. First, we show that substantial manual 
bidding takes place despite the availability of automated bidding tools. Second, there is evidence of interest rate 
dispersion on loans to borrowers with similar credit grades. If the market were competitive we would expect a 
uniform price. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that some lenders, and therefore the market, 
can discriminate betwen higher and lower risk borrowers within an objectively defined credit grade. Hence, lenders 
will engage in search. This evidence of market imperfection leads to questions about P2PL's ability to create a more 
competitive credit market. 
Most data used in this analysis are readily accessible from Prosper's webpage which provides a data download of all 
current and historical publicly available information from the marketplace. Some data, such as payment histories, 
are available only to registered lenders. 
Before discussing the empirical data, it is worthwhile to consider some anecdotal evidence the authors have gained 
from actual P2P lenders. First, lenders corroborate the importance and costly nature of search. Some lenders cite the 
time consuming aspect of being a lender as a reason for exiting the market. At a recent Prosper users conference, a 
lender who employs rather sophisticated models for identifying desireable listings confirmed that he still finds it 
necessary to review each listing before bidding and chooses not to bid on almost half the listings identified. 
The data also point to search as an important component of lender behavior. Prosper allows lenders to place bids 
manually and with automated bidding agents. Data on which bids were placed by which method are not publicly 
available; however, one can assume that almost all bids placed shortly after a listing is posted (within five minutes) 
were automatically generated. This is because the agents continuously monitor the market and place bids when 
certain criteria are met. We use the term immediate bids rather than automatic bids to highlight that we are using a 
proxy for the number of bids placed by automated agents. 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of lenders with at least two immediate bids in a given month out of those lenders with 
at least two total bids. At the end of October 2007 Prosper introduced and began actively promoting Portfolio Plans 
– predefined sets of automatic bidding criteria – which may account for the recent surge in immediate bids. Still, 
most lenders choose to place bids manually. Many people behave as though even relatively simple online 
transactions are surprisingly costly (Hann and Terwiesch 2003; Terwiesch, et. al. 2005), so rational lenders must 
derive some benefit from choosing to bid manually. One explanation, supported anecdotally, is that manual bidding 
provides lenders a chance to screen and evaluate listings before making bidding decisions. This information 
gathering is synonymous with search. Another explanation is that some lenders are trying to strategically time bids. 
If it is in fact possibile to improve one’s market outcomes through strategic behavior then this is further evidence of 
market imperfection. 
Moreover, these data are consistent with P2P lending as a costly activity. The non-trivial number of lenders who 
appear to use automatic bidding underscores that for some people and in some situations the cost of manual bidding 
does not outweigh the benefits. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Lenders Placing at Least Two Immediate Bids in a Month 
Figure 2 is a scatter plot of interest rate by loan amount for all C credit grade borrowers receiving a loan during the 
second quarter of 2007. The actual APR of a borrower is slightly higher when origination fees are included, but 
these fees are not passed on to lenders. The points labeled late are those borrowers that went at least 31 days past 
due at some point in the first 12-15 months of the loan, while timely refers to all other loans. The dashed and solid 
lines are a non-parametric smoothing of the interest rate conditional on loan amount. 
 
Figure 2. C Credit Grade Loan Interest Rates 
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Credit grades are based on Experian's Scorex PLUS model for predicting default risk on new credit accounts 
(Experian 2008; Prosper.com 2008). Considering the C grade borrowers in this figure all share similar default risk, 
we would expect a competitive credit market to offer them more or less the same interest rate on a similarly sized 
loan. But, the data show a striking amount of interest rate dispersion. Plots of other credit grades are similar. 
Additionally, we see that those borrowers that become late are on average paying higher interest rates. There are 
multiple explanations for this observation. For instance, those people that obtain higher interest rates are burdened 
with larger payments which may increase the likelihood of late payments and default. Although, the difference 
between the average interest rates for the two groups is only about 2-3%. These data are also consistent with the idea 
that at least some lenders have an ability to distinguish higher and lower credit risks based on the additional 
information in listings. It is this possibility that makes search a part of these markets. In the models below we 
assume lenders have at least some ability to distinguish higher and lower credit risks within a market segment. 
Literature Review 
In his classic paper, Stigler (1961) points out that “[price] dispersion is ubiquitous even for homogeneous goods.'' 
Why is it that markets for similar goods with large numbers of buyers and sellers do not necessarily converge to a 
single market clearing price? One important answer to this question is information. Market outcomes depend on who 
and how many people have access to certain information, how much information costs and how much effort is 
required to gather it, and the time constraints decision makers face.   
A half-century of economic inquiry has produced numerous models that support equilibrium price dispersion and 
lend insight into how market frictions such as search costs lead to non-competitive market outcomes. The interested 
reader is referred to one of the many excellent surveys on search theory for a broad discussion of the topic (see for 
example Baye, et. al. 2006; McCall and McCall 2008; Rogerson, et. al. 2005).  
As the preceeding section outlined, P2PL markets do not seem aptly described as a frictionless marketplace. The 
information that borrowers provide above and beyond that found in a credit report may contain valuable signals 
about creditworthiness. In an auction setting, interest rates and the number of loans made will depend on how many 
lenders converge on individual listings. In a large market, complete coordination is not something we should expect. 
In the following sections we develop a competing auction model of P2PL. The typical set up for competing auctions 
is as follows. There are a large number of sellers of a homogeneous indivisible good and a large number of buyers 
with unit demand. Buyers typically have heterogeneous valuations for the good. Sellers offer second price auctions 
for the good and are free to set a reserve price for the auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and simultaneously 
choose a single auction to attend. 
Julien et al. (2000) model a labor market in a competing auction framework. In their model, homogeneous 
employees offer their services to the highest bidder above some reservation wage. Homogeneous employers 
simultaneously choose employees to recruit. In a large market, employees post reservation wages equal to their best 
alternative to employment. This is not an uncommon result in competing auctions (McAfee 1993; Peters & 
Severinov 1997). Wage dispersion arises because the wage depends on whether one or more employers recruit the 
same employee.  
Our models diverge from the typical models in a few important ways. In P2PL markets it is the sellers (lenders) that 
try to locate a buyer (borrower) in a reverse auction. However, the borrowers may differ in their creditworthiness, 
and lenders only receive a signal of a borrower’s creditworthiness after selecting the auction. Additionally, we 
consider multiple market segments characterized by different creditworthy to non-creditworthy borrower ratios. This 
partially corresponds to the work of Burdett et al. (2001) in which some sellers have more than one unit of a good to 
sell making it more likely that a buyer will be served if she visits the seller.  
P2P Lending as Competing Auctions 
The general structure of a P2PL market is as follows. Borrowers come to the market to purchase credit. Upon 
arriving at the market they will post a maximum price, or reservation price, that they are willing to pay for the credit. 
Final prices are determined via auction. Lenders come to the market to find borrowers to whom they will extend 
credit. They submit interest rate bids on borrowers' credit requests at or below the posted reservation prices. 
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Lenders have access to structured objective credit information on prospective borrowers which they use to segment 
the market into groups of similar borrowers. Within these segments there is still diversity in creditworthiness and 
additional screening may be carried out to further determine a borrower's creditworthiness. For instance lenders may 
evaluate the completeness of the subjective information or its consistency with the objective data. Additionally, a 
more thorough evaluation of the objective data may also be possible. 
For simplicity, borrowers may be either creditworthy (𝐶𝐶) or non-creditworthy (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶). Creditworthy borrowers fully 
intend to repay their loan and have the potential to do so, but non-creditworthy borrowers come to the market 
intending to default or with no means to actually repay the loan. Creditworthy borrowers repay their loan with 
certainty and non-creditworthy borrowers default and pay nothing with certainty. 
We consider two market segments, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝑙𝑙, ℎ}, where all 𝑙𝑙-borrowers (low risk) are creditworthy but only a fraction, 
Γ, of ℎ-borrowers (high risk) are creditworthy. In the first model presented below lenders can always identify a non-
creditworthy borrower, whereas in the second model there will be some probability that a lender incorrectly 
classifies a non-creditworthy borrower as creditworthy. 
Borrowers are in the market to purchase one unit of credit and each lender has one unit to sell. Prices in this market 
are interest rates. The loans are either paid back in full with interest, in which case a lender earns a return equal to 
the final interest rate on the loan, or the borrower defaults and repays nothing, which corresponds to a payoff of -1. 
Assume lenders who do not participate on a loan leave the market with a payoff of 0. Lenders are risk neutral. In a 
dynamic model this fallback value would be the expected value of participating in the market again in a future 
period. 
We will also assume creditworthy borrowers have access to a financing option outside the market. This modeling 
choice reflects the current position of P2PL as an alternative to traditional credit markets. Let 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙  and 𝜔𝜔ℎ  represent 
these alternative options for creditworthy low and high risk borrowers, respectively. The non-creditworthy 
borrowers will behave as if they have 𝜔𝜔ℎ  as an outside option because to do otherwise would signal their type. 
We present a one-period, three-stage game. First, borrowers set their reservation prices. Second, lenders choose a 
single borrower for inspection. Third, if the lender has chosen a borrower she believes is creditworthy, she competes 
in an English auction in which her strategy is to bid until she is indifferent between the expected value of winning 
and taking the outside option of 0. 
Perfect Screening 
This section assumes non-creditworthy borrowers can be identified by a lender inspection. The perfect screening 
model is a special case of the model presented in the next section, which is a more general but less analytically 
tractable model. 
Lenders will observe 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙  and 𝐵𝐵ℎ  borrowers in the two segments with each borrower posting a respective reservation 
price. Additionally, it is common knowledge that only Γ𝐵𝐵ℎ  high risk borrowers are creditworthy and that there are 
𝐿𝐿 + 1 lenders searching for loans. Much of the analysis that follows is from the perspective of a single lender, so 𝐿𝐿 
is the number of other lenders in the market from the perspective of an individual lender. 
We seek a symmetric equilibrium in which all 𝑙𝑙-borrowers post the same reservation price 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗, all ℎ-borrowers post 
𝜌𝜌ℎ
∗ , and the probability that a lender inspects a specific 𝑙𝑙-borrower or ℎ-borrower is 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙∗(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗,𝜌𝜌ℎ∗) and 𝑞𝑞ℎ∗(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗,𝜌𝜌ℎ∗), 
respectively. 
Lender Strategy 
Consider a scenario in which one 𝑙𝑙-borrower posts 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  while the rest post 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  and all ℎ-borrowers post 𝜌𝜌ℎ . The 
symmetric mixed strategy lender response is to inspect a nondeviating 𝑙𝑙-borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , the deviating 
𝑙𝑙-borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , and an ℎ-borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞ℎ . 
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In accord with standard game theoretic analysis, a lender must be indifferent between selecting any particular 
borrower when all other lenders play the equilibrium mixed strategy; therefore, an equilibrium will satisfy:  
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙)𝐿𝐿 = 𝜌𝜌ℎΓ ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ)𝐿𝐿 
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙)𝐿𝐿 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿 
𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑 + (𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 1)𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑞𝑞ℎ = 1 
𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0, 𝑞𝑞ℎ ≥ 0. 
The first two expressions simply equate the expected return from playing any individual pure strategy when all other 
lenders employ the equilibrium mixed strategy. The expected payoff is the probability of being the only lender on a 
creditworthy listing times the reservation price of the listing. Any outcome other than being the sole lender on a 
creditworthy borrower yields a payoff of 0. The last two expressions assure the probabilities sum to one and all 
probabilities are non negative. 
The first three expressions form a system of equations that can be solved for 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ,𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ,𝜌𝜌ℎ), 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ,𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ,𝜌𝜌ℎ), 
𝑞𝑞ℎ(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ,𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ,𝜌𝜌ℎ): 
 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑 = �2−𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙−𝐵𝐵ℎ+(𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙−1)�𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙 �
1
𝐿𝐿+𝐵𝐵ℎ ∙� 𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ�1𝐿𝐿�
�1+(𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙−1)�𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙 �1𝐿𝐿+𝐵𝐵ℎ ∙� 𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ�1𝐿𝐿�
, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 = �−𝐵𝐵ℎ+�𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑�
1
𝐿𝐿+𝐵𝐵ℎ ∙� 𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ�1𝐿𝐿�
�−1+𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙+�𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙
𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑�
1
𝐿𝐿+𝐵𝐵ℎ ∙� 𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ�1𝐿𝐿�
, 𝑞𝑞ℎ = �1−𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙+�𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 �
1
𝐿𝐿+(𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙−1)�𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙 �1𝐿𝐿�
�𝐵𝐵ℎ+�𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ
𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑 �
1
𝐿𝐿+(𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙−1)�𝜌𝜌ℎ  Γ𝜌𝜌 𝑙𝑙 �1𝐿𝐿�
. 
 One can derive similar expressions for the scenario of an ℎ-borrower deviating. 
Borrower Strategy 
With the lender responses to a vector of interest rates specified, we can determine the reservation prices borrowers 
will post in equilibrium. We must consider the deviation of an individual borrower from the reservation price posted 
by similar borrowers, and this must be done for both 𝑙𝑙- and ℎ-borrowers. 
Let 𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥 = �𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ,𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ,𝜌𝜌ℎ� and 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) = ∂∂𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 [𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)]. An 𝑙𝑙-borrower who is considering deviating from the reservation 
price posted by similar borrowers, 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , will choose 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  to:  min
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑
  𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃(no bidders) + 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(exactly one bidder),  
or min
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑
  𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥))𝐿𝐿+1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1) ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥))𝐿𝐿 . 
 The first order condition for the preceding minimization problem is,  
−𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 ⋅ �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)�𝐿𝐿 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1) ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) + (𝐿𝐿 + 1) ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) ⋅ �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)�𝐿𝐿 + 
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙
𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1) ⋅ �𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)� ⋅ �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)�𝐿𝐿 − 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1) ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) ⋅ �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥)�𝐿𝐿−1 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿) ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(𝛒𝛒𝐥𝐥) = 0. 
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Again, we are interested in the symmetric equilibrium where all 𝑙𝑙-borrowers find it optimal to post 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗. Therefore, 
the first order condition must be satisfied when we replace 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  with 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 . If this were not the case then the deviator 
would find it beneficial to set a different reservation price. Ideally we would make this substitution and solve for 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  
thus deriving the 𝑙𝑙-borrowers' reaction to a posted 𝜌𝜌ℎ , but this is not possible. We can however solve for 𝜌𝜌ℎ ,  
𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ∙ (𝐵𝐵ℎ)𝐿𝐿Γ � 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 ∙ (1 − 𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙) − 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ∙ (1 − 𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 𝐿𝐿)𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 ∙ (1 − 2𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙2 + 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵ℎ) − 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 ∙ (1 − 2𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙2 + 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵ℎ + 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵ℎ)�𝐿𝐿 . 
This results in an inverse reaction function – given 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , for which 𝜌𝜌ℎ  is it a best response. Repeating the preceding 
steps for a deviating ℎ-borrower yields, 
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = Γ𝜌𝜌ℎ ∙ (𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙)𝐿𝐿 � 𝜔𝜔ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙) − 𝜌𝜌ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝐵𝐵ℎ − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 𝐿𝐿)𝜔𝜔ℎ ∙ (1 − 2𝐵𝐵ℎ + 𝐵𝐵ℎ2 + 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙) − 𝜌𝜌ℎ ∙ (1 − 2𝐵𝐵ℎ + 𝐵𝐵ℎ2 + 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 + 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙)�𝐿𝐿 . 
The equilibrium reservation prices, 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗ and 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ , simultaneously solve these two equations. Solving this system 
numerically for a number of examples reveals that in a large market 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗ ≈ 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ ≈ 𝜔𝜔ℎ . Figure 3 is a 
representative example. In this example the model parameters are: Γ = .9, 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 = .1, 𝜔𝜔ℎ = .15. Also, the horizontal 
axis shows the number of creditworthy borrowers in each segment (𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 = Γ𝐵𝐵ℎ). Each line is for a separate lender to 
creditworthy borrower ratio. As the market scale increases the posted reservation price approaches the value of the 
external financing option. 
 
Figure 3. Reservation Price Converging to Best Alternative 
Imperfect Screening 
We now modify the model presented in the previous section to include the possibility that a non-creditworthy 
borrower will receive a loan. This is both more realistic and actually gives non-creditworthy borrowers a reason to 
be in the market. Again the market contains 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙  𝑙𝑙-borrowers, 𝐵𝐵ℎ  ℎ-borrowers (of which Γ are creditworthy), and 
𝐿𝐿 + 1 lenders. Assume creditworthy borrowers are classified as creditworthy with probability 1, 𝑃𝑃(deem C|𝐶𝐶) = 1; 
however, lenders independently misclassify non-creditworthy borrowers as creditworthy with probability 𝑝𝑝, 
𝑃𝑃(deem 𝐶𝐶|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶) = 𝑝𝑝. 
Again, lenders will compete in an English auction. If a lender deems a borrower to be non-creditworthy she does not 
participate in the auction, so lenders will only observe the number of other lenders that have deemed a borrower to 
be creditworthy. Observing competing lenders will lead to a higher degree of confidence that an ℎ-borrower is 
0.145
0.146
0.147
0.148
0.149
0.15
25 250 2500
h-
bo
rr
ow
er
 R
es
er
va
ti
on
 P
ri
ce
Number of Creditworthy Borrowers in each Segment
Lender/Borrower = 0.5 Lender/Borrower = 1 Lender/Borrower = 1.5
Economics of Information Systems 
10 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008  
creditworthy. This increased probability that a borrower is creditworthy will be reflected in the lowest rate a lender 
is willing to accept – her reservation value. Hence, lenders have a reservation value for a borrower's listing which is 
based on the likelihood the loan is repaid, not to be confused with borrowers' reservation price, which is the posted 
maximum interest rate on the listing. 
The stages (reservation price posting, borrower selection and inspection, and bidding) remain the same. We assume 
that after selecting a borrower for inspection lenders ignore all market activity on other listings. So, reservation 
values are conditioned on the number of competing lenders on the selected borrower instead of all market activity. 
Lender Reservation Values 
 If a lender believes an ℎ-borrower is creditworthy there is still the possibility that the borrower is non-creditworthy, 
and the amount she is willing to bid will depend on the likelihood the borrower was misclassified. When lenders 
independently select a borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞, then from an individual lender's perspective 𝑁𝑁~𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿, 𝑞𝑞) 
is the random number of other lenders that select the same listing. Lenders do not observe this value. Rather, they 
observe bids from other lenders who think the borrower is creditworthy; therefore, 
𝑋𝑋 ~ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁, 𝑝𝑝) when borrower type = 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 and 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑁𝑁, when borrower type = 𝐶𝐶. 
Let ϕ(𝑥𝑥) denote the probability that a borrower is creditworthy given that a lender believes the borrower is 
creditworthy and observes 𝑥𝑥 competing lenders (who have also deemed the borrower creditworthy). By application 
of Bayes rule, 
ϕ(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃(lender + 𝑥𝑥 deem 𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶)𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶)
𝑃𝑃(lender + 𝑥𝑥 deem 𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶)𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) + 𝑃𝑃(lender + 𝑥𝑥 deem 𝐶𝐶|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 = 𝑥𝑥)Γ
𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 = 𝑥𝑥)Γ + 𝑝𝑝 ⋅ (1 − Γ)𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶),                                            
 where  
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶) = � ‍𝐿𝐿
𝑏𝑏=𝑥𝑥 �𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥� 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏−𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 = 𝑏𝑏). 
 After some manipulation,  
ϕ(𝑥𝑥) = Γ(𝐿𝐿 − 𝑥𝑥)!
Γ(𝐿𝐿 − 𝑥𝑥)! + 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥+1(1 − Γ)∑ ‍𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏=𝑥𝑥 1(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑥𝑥)! (𝐿𝐿 − 𝑏𝑏)! �𝑞𝑞(1 − 𝑝𝑝)1 − 𝑞𝑞 �𝑏𝑏−𝑥𝑥 . 
In the perfect screening model competition on a listing drove interest rates to lenders' fall back option, 0, because 
there was no uncertainty about a borrower's type after evaluation. In the current model competition will drive rates 
to the point where expected return is 0, and these rates will differ depending on the number of competing lenders. In 
the previous model observed interest rates are either reservation prices or 0, but in this model a greater variety of 
prices will be observed based on the amount of competition. 
Let 𝑏𝑏(𝑥𝑥) be the reservation value of a lender when she observes 𝑥𝑥 competing lenders and believes the borrower is 
creditworthy. This reservation value makes the lender indifferent between her fall back value 0 and the expected 
return from a winning bid; therefore,  ϕ(𝑥𝑥) ⋅ 𝑏𝑏(𝑥𝑥) + [1 −ϕ(𝑥𝑥)] ⋅ (−1) = 0, and 𝑏𝑏(𝑥𝑥) = [1 − ϕ(𝑥𝑥)] ϕ(𝑥𝑥)⁄  . 
Equilibrium 
Characterizing equilibrium in this model is more difficult because we cannot get nice closed form expressions for 
the equilibrium lender mixing strategy. We outline below the procedure we used to numerically arrive at the 
equilibrium values 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙∗, 𝑞𝑞ℎ∗ , 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗, and 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ . The general idea is to iteratively propose candidate borrower reservation 
prices until a fixed point is found where the deviators' best response and the candidate reservation prices match. We 
have not developed a formal proof that convergence to this fixed point necessarily constitutes an equilibrium. 
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As before the expected payoff to a lender from selecting any particular borrower must be the same. Recall that 
competition among lenders on a listing drives interest rates to the point where the expected return of a winning bid is 
0. So, the only scenarios that enter into the expected payoff from selecting a particular listing are those when the 
lender is the only bidder. All terms when competition is observed net out. 
The expected payoff to a lender from selecting an ℎ-borrower posting 𝜌𝜌 when all other lenders are searching this 
borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞 is,  
𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌, 𝑞𝑞) = 𝜌𝜌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 0|𝐶𝐶)𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) + (−1)𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 0|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)                                = 𝜌𝜌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 = 0)Γ − 𝑝𝑝 ∙ (1 − Γ)𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 0|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶)                                               
= 𝜌𝜌Γ ∙ (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝 ∙ (1 − Γ)� ‍𝐿𝐿
𝑏𝑏=0 (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏 �𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏� 𝑞𝑞𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿−𝑏𝑏 . 
The first part of the expression is the probability the lender faces no competition on a creditworthy borrower times 
the payoff that occurs. The second part is the probability that no other lenders bid and the borrower is non-
creditworthy, resulting in a payoff of -1. 
All 𝑙𝑙-borrowers are creditworthy, so a lender's expected payoff when selecting an 𝑙𝑙-borrower posting 𝜌𝜌 when all 
other lenders select this borrower with probability 𝑞𝑞 is:  
𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌, 𝑞𝑞) = 𝜌𝜌 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿 . 
If one 𝑙𝑙-borrower posts 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  while the rest post 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  and all ℎ-borrowers post 𝜌𝜌ℎ , then a condition for a symmetric 
equilibrium is 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ , 𝑞𝑞ℎ) and 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑). Similarly, when one ℎ-borrower deviates an 
equilibrium condition is 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ , 𝑞𝑞ℎ) and 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑). 
Consider the decision problem of a deviating 𝑙𝑙-borrower. Because 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ  are treated as fixed, the deviator will 
select 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  with the knowledge that it will affect the probability lenders assign to the selection of all borrowers. In 
choosing 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , the borrower also effectively chooses 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , and 𝑞𝑞ℎ . The deviating borrower faces the following non-
linear optimization problem in which she minimizes her expected payout with decision variables 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ :  min  𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 ∙ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿+1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1)𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿 subject to:                                                                            
𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ , 𝑞𝑞ℎ) 
𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ,𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) (𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 − 1)𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑞𝑞ℎ + 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 = 1 
𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0,𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 . 
 Likewise, a deviating ℎ-borrower will minimize her expected payout by choosing  𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ :  min  𝜔𝜔ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿+1 + 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (𝐿𝐿 + 1)𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑 ⋅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿 + � ‍𝐿𝐿+1
𝑏𝑏=2 𝑏𝑏(𝑏𝑏 − 1) �𝐿𝐿 + 1    𝑏𝑏 � (𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐿𝐿+1−𝑏𝑏  subject to:                                                                             
𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ , 𝑞𝑞ℎ) 
𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙(𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙) = 𝑉𝑉ℎ(𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑)  𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 + (𝐵𝐵ℎ − 1)𝑞𝑞ℎ + 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 1  
𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ , 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑑 ≥ 0,𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝜔𝜔ℎ . 
An equilibrium {𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗,𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ , 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙∗, 𝑞𝑞ℎ∗} is identified if: 1) a deviating 𝑙𝑙-borrower’s best response to 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗ and 𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗  is to 
post 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗, 2) a deviating ℎ-borrower’s best response to 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗ and 𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗  is to post 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ , and 3) all 
lenders are indifferent between selecting any individual borrower given all other lenders select borrowers using 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙∗ 
and 𝑞𝑞ℎ∗ . 
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A procedure for finding such an equilibrium proceeds as follows:   
1. Set 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑐𝑐  to a candidate equilibrium  
2. Set 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑐𝑐   
3. Solve the deviating 𝑙𝑙-borrower’s optimization problem  
4. Round the optimal 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  to four decimal places in the direction that yields the lower objective function value 
inclusive of lender response  
5. Set 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 , where 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  is the rounded value from step 4  
6. Solve the deviating ℎ-borrower’s optimization problem  
7. Round the optimal 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑  to four decimal places in the direction that yields the lower objective function value 
inclusive of lender response  
8. Set 𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑 , where 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑑𝑑  is the rounded value from step 7  
9. If 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑐𝑐 , then 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙∗ = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗ = 𝜌𝜌ℎ   
10. Else, Set 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 = 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑐𝑐 = 𝜌𝜌ℎ  and return to step 3  
Based on the results from the previous section and the common result that reservation prices in competing auctions 
tend toward the poster’s best alternative (Julien et al. 2000; McAfee 1993; Peters and Severinov 1997), our initial 
candidate was 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 = 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙  and 𝜌𝜌ℎ𝑐𝑐 = 𝜔𝜔ℎ . Rounding is consistent with the fact that interest rates in these markets are to 4 
decimal places. The numerical examples we present below were derived with the preceding procedure. In all cases 
𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙
∗ and 𝜌𝜌ℎ∗  are very close to 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙  and 𝜔𝜔ℎ . This is consistent with the prior competing auction results. Furthermore, 
when 𝑝𝑝 = 0 we have a special case of the perfect screening model. For the numerical results we present in the 
following section, when 𝑝𝑝 = 0 this procedure and the equilibrium from the analytical results are the same 
(accounting for rounding). This suggests that for the cases we present, we have identified an equilibrium. 
Analysis 
As we pointed out in the introduction, the model we have outlined does not get us to the point where we can make 
any firm statements about person-to-person lending’s capacity to create more competitive credit markets. In fact, the 
structure of the current model actually forces the conclusion that P2PL is welfare enhancing. The worst case 
scenario for all market participants is that they receive their fallback option and there is the possibilty to do better. 
Additionally, this outside option is exogenous and is not tied to the other parameters of the model.  However, a 
slightly richer dynamic model that incorporates search costs will be a basic building block of a more comprehensive 
model.  
That disclaimer aside, this model does produce several of the empirical facts found in the Prosper data and allows us 
to consider how market frictions impact outcomes. The analysis that follows is based on numerical results. In all 
cases we assume the number of lenders is 500, the number of 𝑙𝑙-borrowers is 250 and the external financing options 
are 𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙 =.1 and 𝜔𝜔ℎ =.15 for 𝑙𝑙-borrowers and ℎ-borrowers, respectively. The misclassification probability, 𝑝𝑝, and the 
fraction of creditworthy ℎ-borrowers, Γ, will be varied. In all cases we hold the number of creditworthy ℎ-borrowers 
at 250, so 𝐵𝐵ℎ = 250 Γ⁄ . With this setup there is the potential for all lenders to participate on a loan, but in a 
competing auction framework this is far from the expected outcome.   
An important empirical observation from Figure 2 was the substantial interest rate dispersion for borrowers with 
similar credit grades. Table 2 provides a specific example of ℎ-borrowers’ equilibrium outcomes for a given 
scenario. The table shows the interest rate that would prevail on a loan when different numbers of competing bidders 
arrive. The model does in fact produce a distribution of interest rates as a result of the lender evaluations and the 
random number of arriving lenders. The table also provides the probability that each specific number of bids is 
observed conditional on creditworthiness. Also evident is the higher average interest rate for non-creditworthy 
borrowers, mirroring what we observed in Figure 2. For the same set of parameters the average interest rate for an 𝑙𝑙-
borrower is .052 and the probability an 𝑙𝑙-borrower gets a loan is almost .7.  So an 𝑙𝑙-borrower gets a loan with higher 
probability and when she gets a loan the expected savings when compared to the outside option is greater than the 
expected savings for an ℎ-borrower that receives a loan. All creditworthy borrowers are in fact the same in this 
model, but being associated with the high risk segment means creditworthy ℎ-borrowers do worse than creditworthy 
𝑙𝑙-borrowers.  
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Table 2. 𝒉𝒉-borrower Equilibrium Outcome ( 𝚪𝚪 = .9,  𝒑𝒑 = .5 ) 
Bids Int. Rate P(bids=x|C) P(bids=x| NC) 
0 NA 0.48 0.69 
1 0.1500 0.35 0.25 
2 0.0400 0.13 0.05 
3 0.0200 0.03 0.01 
4 0.0100 0.01 0 
5 0.0050 0.00 0 
  E(Loan Int. Rate|C): 0.1131 
  E( Loan Int. Rate|NC): 0.1308 
 
Another empirical observation is that the probability a prospective borrower gets a loan decreases with credit grade. 
This is evident in Table 3 which summarizes Prosper listings that ran between March 1, 2007 and October 30, 2007 
and had an amount requested below $5000, debt-to-income ratio below .4, current delinquencies equal to 0, and 
delinquencies in past 7 years less than 4. Pope and Sydnor (2008) also find that credit grade is an important predictor 
of a successful listing even after adding other controls. This pattern is also noticeable in our competing auction 
framework. 
Figure 4 shows the total probability a lender selects a listing from the 𝑙𝑙-segment of the market (250 ∙  𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙∗). Each 
curve is for a different misclassification probability and the horizontal axis shows the fraction of creditworthy 
borrowers in the ℎ-segment. In general, as more non-creditworthy borrowers enter the ℎ-segment (as Γ decreases), 
more of the traffic becomes concentrated in the 𝑙𝑙-segment. The effect is more pronounced when it is more difficult 
for lenders to tell the creditworthy from the non-creditworthy. Tieing this result to the Prosper data, it is more 
appropriate to think of borrowers as being “sufficiently” creditworthy within a given credit grade. It is certainly the 
case that borrowers with AA credit are more likely to repay their loans than a high risk HR borrower, but this is 
presumably compensated for in the interest rates. Even within the HR category their may be borrowers that represent 
a good risk/return trade-off and others that do not, hence the “sufficiently” creditworthy.  If lower credit grades 
generally have fewer sufficiently creditworthy borrowers, then the frictions are higher in those markets (finding a 
sufficiently creditworthy borrower takes more effort) and lenders may choose to investigate more listings in the 
better credit categories. This could produce outcomes as in Table 3.   
Table 3. Empirical Funding Outcomes 
  
 Credit 
Grade Listings 
Funded 
Listings 
Funding 
Probability 
AA 426 293 0.688 
A 287 187 0.652 
B 276 164 0.594 
C 427 233 0.546 
D 663 230 0.347 
E 472 110 0.233 
HR 964 120 0.124 
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Figure 4. Lender Migration to 𝒍𝒍-segment   
An important point is that the number of loans to ℎ-borrowers decreases when more non-creditworthy borrowers are 
present not only because these entrants are less likely to get a loan, but also because lenders in aggregate are less 
likely to select from the ℎ-segment. Simply looking at the empirical summaries as in Table 3 may overstate the 
number of non-creditworthy borrowers because they ignore the impact frictions have on what market segments 
lenders search most frequently. The reduced competiton for ℎ-borrowers when frictions are high also means higher 
average interest rates in that segment.   
 
 
Figure 5. Expected Number of Loans Market-Wide 
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Figure 5 shows the expected number of loans created in the perfect screening model (𝑝𝑝 = 0) as the number of non-
creditworthy borrowers is varied. Even when all borrowers are creditworthy, the expected number of loans is less 
than 320 out of the 500 possible. The addition of non-creditworthy borrowers causes additional difficulty in the 
productive matching of borrowers and lenders. 
Clearly the competing auction environment of P2PL, with its interest rate dispersion and missed opportunities for 
productive matches, does not lead to a competitive market outcome.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have provided empirical evidence that P2PL markets involve search and that the interest rates for 
similar borrowers exhibit substantial dispersion. We developed a highly stylized competing auction model, which 
despite its simplifying assumptions still exhibits many of the features found in P2PL data. The motivation for this 
research was to consider the potential for P2PL in creating a more competitive credit market. A more comprehensive 
model is needed to fully understand the potential for P2PL, but the competing auction framework appears to be a 
reasonable departure point.  
A more complete model would have a number of moving parts. First, we have completely abstracted from the fact 
that it typically takes a group of lenders to fund a loan. In some ways this adds friction, the listing a lender has bid 
on may never become a loan, but it also has a coordination aspect. A complete model should also allow for the 
endogenous entry of market participants and for interaction between the intermediated and P2P credit markets. The 
one period assumption in this paper is also very restrictive and should be replaced by a richer dynamic model that 
accounts for search costs and perhaps other opportunity costs borne by market participants. A particularly interesting 
path for future research is to empirically estimate the parameters of a model like the one presented above.    
The primary parameters in the model are in some ways under the control of P2P market operators or perhaps a third 
party service provider. Tools could be provided to aid in screening listings and policies could be put in place to 
reduce the entry of non-creditworthy borrowers. Prosper has indeed taken some steps along these lines. Prospective 
borrowers are given guidance on a starting interest rate. This could be the difference between a borrower being 
“sufficiently” creditworthy and not. Similarly, lenders receive warnings if they bid an interest rate too low to 
compensate for the observed historical default rate on similar listings. 
The power of the Internet to link one individual to another for all manner of human activity is profound, and person-
to-person lending is a bright new example of that power. Time will tell if these markets truly have the ability to 
bring about competitive change in the credit markets. 
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